OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

				16	January 1976
Мето	For	Lt	General	Brent	Scowcroft

Brent:

In the interest of early warning you may find the attached memo useful. A WSAG working group meeting may be worthwhile.

JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR. Major General, USA Military Assistant

SEC DEF HAS SEEN

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

16 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Lebanon

On Wednesday the DIA circulated its intelligence appraisal of the situation in Lebanon. It concluded that a possible course of events for the near future would include an Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, followed by general hostilities between Syria and Israel.

I asked the DIA to evaluate possible Soviet reactions to that course of events, and they have just now provided the following assessment:

- No military reaction 1 percent.
- b. Provoke an incident in other parts of the world to divert US attention and resources (e.g., Berlin, Guantanamo, Panama Canal, etc.) - 10 percent.
 - Dispatch Soviet Combat Forces into the area.
 - (1)Into Syria.
 - (a) Damascus not threatened by an Israeli incursion -5 percent.
 - (b) Damascus endangered by Israeli forces 50 percent.
 - (2) Into Lebanon - 1 percent.
 - Into other countries in proximity: for example Iraq or Egypt - 1 percent.
 - Harass US airlift operation 1 percent.
- e. Conduct a naval blockade of arms/POL carrying ships going to Israel - 1 percent.
 - f. Military attack on Israel I percent.

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Chief, Declass Br Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS









- g. Strengthen Soviet Mediterranean Naval Forces 90 percent.
- h. Encourage host countries to deny the US the use of airfields necessary to resupply Israel 90 percent.
- i. Encourage Arabs to impose oil embargo against US and NATO in the event the US moves resolutely to support Israel 90 percent.
 - j. Expedite military equipment deliveries to Syria 95 percent.
- k. Place airborne troops and supporting transport aircraft on increased alert 90 percent.

As reflected above, the last four categories are the most likely courses of action the Soviets will adopt.

I recommend that I be authorized and directed to distribute this assessment to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, together with the recommendation that he distribute it to the WSAG principals.

Approve 16 JAN 1976

Other ____



